When a local user wants to publish an activity, we were always GETing the
recipient actor, so that we could determine their inbox and POST the activity
to it. But now, instead, whenever we GET an actor (whether it's for the key sig
verification or for determining inbox URI), we keep their inbox URI in the
database, and we don't need to GET it again next time.
I'm not sure what the best balance is, but once an hour may end up causing a
lot more key re-fetch requests coming from other servers. I prefer to default
to once a day for now (maybe even once a week) and tighten it later if needed.
Caveat: If an instance key is rotated once a day, there's no
change-key-right-after-toot-deletion thing for deniability. Potentially,
rotation may happen only 24 hours after that deletion, which is much more than
1 hour. On the other hand, it's a whole instance key, not personal key of the
actor.
Using a dedicated type allows to record in the type the guarantees that we
provide, such as scheme being HTTPS and authority being present. Allows to
replace ugly `fromJust` and such with direct field access.
Before, there was a single key used as a personal key for all actors. Now,
things work like this:
- There are 2 keys, each time one is rotated, this way the old key remains
valid and we can freely rotate without a risk of race conditions on other
servers and end up with our posts being rejected
- The keys are explicitly instance-scope keys, all actors refer to them
- We add the ActivityPub-Actor header to all activity POSTs we send, to declare
for which specific actor our signature applies. Activities and otherwise
different payloads may have varying ways to specify attribution; using this
header will be a standard uniform way to specify the actor, regardless of
payload format. Of course, servers should make sure the actual activity is
attributed to the same actor we specified in the header. (This is important
with instance-scope keys; for personal keys it's not critical)
Allow keys to specify expiration time using w3c security vocabulary. If a key
has expired, we treat it like sig validation failure and re-fetch the key from
the other server. And we never accept a sig, even a valid sig, if the key has
expired.
Since servers keep actors and keys in the DB, expiration can be a nice way to
ask that keys aren't used more than we want them to. The security vocab spec
also recommends to set expiration time on keys, so it's nice to support this
feature.
It's now possible for activities we be attributed to actors that have more than
one key. We allow up to 2 keys. We also store in the DB. Scaling to support any
number of keys is trivial, but I'm limiting to 2 to avoid potential trouble and
because 2 is the actual number we need.
By having 2 keys, and replacing only one of them in each rotation, we avoid
race conditions. With 1 key, the following can happen:
1. We send an activity to another server
2. We rotate our key
3. The server reaches the activity in its processing queue, tries to verify our
request signature, but fails because it can't fetch the key. It's the old
key and we discarded it already, replaced it with the new one
When we use 2 keys, the previous key remains available and other servers have
time to finish processing our requests signed with that key. We can safely
rotate, without worrying about whether the user sent anything right before the
rotation time.
Caveat: With this feature, we allow OTHER servers to rotate freely. It's safe
because it's optional, but it's just Vervis right now. Once Vervis itself
starts using 2 keys, it will be able to rotate freely without race condition
risk, but probably Mastodon etc. won't accept its signatures because of the use
of 2 keys and because they're server-scope keys.
Maybe I can get these features adopted by the fediverse?
Shared key means the key is used for multiple actors. I'm not sure explicitly
specifying this will be necessary, but I prefer to have it in place to help
with debugging in case something unexpected comes from other servers, or my
format overlaps with stuff used in other software and encodes a different
meaning.
Each public key can specify whether it's shared or personal, and this patch
checks for that when verifying a request signature. It rejects shared keys,
accepting valid sigs only from personal keys.
Very soon I'll add shared key support.
* Repo collab now supports basic default roles developer/user/guest like
project collab does
* User/Anon collab for repos and projects are now stored as fields instead of
in dedicated tables, there was never a need for dedicated tables but I didn't
see that before
* Repo push op is now part of `ProjectOperation`
* `RepoRole` and related code has been entirely removed, only project roles
remain and they're used for both repos and projects
* This is the first not-totally-trivial DB migration in Vervis, it's automatic
but please be careful and report errors
* When adding collaborators, you don't need a custom role. If you don't choose
one, a basic default "developer" role will be used
* If you don't assign a `ProjectCollabUser` role, a default "user" role is
assumed for logged in users, otherwise a "guest" role
* The "guest" role currently has no access at all
* Theoretically there may also be a "maintainer" role allowing project
sharers/maintainers to give maintainer-level access to more people, but right
now maintainer role would be the same as developer so I haven't added it yet
It already had one, but it didn't have a public key and it was using the old
mess of the Vervis.ActivityStreams module, which I'll possibly remove soon.
It's hopefully more elegant now.
This patch includes some ugliness and commented out code. Sorry for that. I'll
clean it up soon.
Basically there's a TVar holding a Vector of at most 10 AP activities. You can
freely POST stuff to /inbox, and then GET /inbox and see what you posted, or an
error description saying why your activity was rejected.
